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Response to Scottish Government’s ‘Draft Offshore Wind Policy Statement: 
Consultation’ 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
We thank you for the opportunity to respond to this important consultation. Below we 
outline our combined response to Scottish Government’s consultation on its Draft 
Offshore Wind Policy Statement. 
We have not responded directly to all the questions raised in the consultation but have 
instead targeted a large selection of these. Some of the responses will have relevance 
to multiple questions and where this is the case, we have tried to make this clear. 
Wherever possible we have also cited underpinning research to provide an evidence-
based response to the consultation’s questions. 
Should you have any queries, please feel free to contact us. We look forward to 
hearing from you in due course. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Dr. Matthew Hannon, Dr. David McMillan (University of Strathclyde) 
Eva Topham (DNV GL Renewables Advisory and University of Strathclyde) 
Additional input from Sally Shenton of Generating Better. 
  
 Consultation Response 
 
3. What actions do you believe should be taken by the Scottish Government, UK 
Government and agencies in order to realise the full potential of Scotland’s 
offshore wind sector? 
First some important context. The CfD has been incredibly effective at reducing the 
cost of offshore wind projects. Projects in the 2019 auction are approaching merchant 
prices (zero subsidy). However, this has come at the price of a very substantial supply 
chain squeeze. Margins on contracts in the wind industry are much lower than in the 
past (McKinsey 2018). This situation tends to favour countries with lower production 
cost bases than compared to Scotland (OffshoreWind.biz 2019). Consequently, this is 
one of the key reasons that driving up the local content should be seen as a 
UK/Scottish government responsibility, since increasing local content could have the 
unintended consequence of making UK-led projects less cost-competitive.   
There are effectively two strategies open to the Scottish and UK government when it 
comes to increasing the local supply chain share.  
1. Large structural interventions – Examples include co-funding a major 
manufacturing facility similar to the investment, which led to the Siemens blade 
factory in Hull (Green Port Hull 2016). These interventions require substantial 
public funds and probably a good deal of certainty regarding the project pipeline 
in Scottish & UK waters in the coming decades. Such an intervention would 
result in a large uplift in highly skilled jobs that the government is looking for, 
albeit partly at public expense. 
2. Smaller, more targeted interventions – Examples include funding for supply 
chain technology competitions, such as via the Offshore Wind Accelerator 
(OWA) and ORE Catapults ‘backing the game changers’ scheme (ORE 
Catapult 2020). 
Ultimately, both are important. The first option is certainly more challenging to deliver, 
as it would require a significant and concerted effort, involving a major turbine Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), such as Siemens Gamesa, Mitsubishi/Vestas and 
General Electric. It would also require substantial and wide-ranging political support in 
order to drawdown the necessary funds. The location of such a facility is key to any 
political support and the expected gross value added (GVA) these interventions 
provide in different locations, not least tax receipts, employment benefits and wider 
supply chain benefits. When looking back in 2030 and beyond, with a huge amount of 
offshore wind deployed in Scottish waters, there could be a sense of missed 
opportunity without considering such major interventions. 
The second option (smaller more targeted interventions run as competitions) has 
certainly resulted in some excellent work being done. The key to this has been the 
 
competitive nature of the OWA tenders, which evaluates projects based on a very high 
degree of technical and economic merit. This model has been highly successful to 
date. 
4. What are the key regulatory and cost challenges facing the offshore wind 
sector? 
Capital costs 
The offshore wind sector has achieved some huge cost reductions in recent times. In 
this rush to achieve very competitive CfD bids, the supply chain has come under 
intense pressure to lower its costs. It remains to be seen how sustainable these cost 
reductions are for different parts of the supply chain.  
Much of the recent existing cost reduction drive has come from rapid up-scaling of 
wind turbines and current designs in the 8-12 MW bracket are pushing at the limits of 
what can be achieved with current turbine technology. There is a risk that some of the 
capital cost reductions, which have been achieved on recent projects, could be 
counterbalanced by higher operational costs (Carroll et al. 2016). 
Decommissioning & recycling costs 
As the first tranche of operational projects approach their end of life, decommissioning 
costs are becoming a growing concern in terms of life-time project costs. 
Decommissioning costs have traditionally been underestimated and represent 
approximately 60-70% of the installation costs of offshore wind projects (Smith et al. 
2015), standing at over £200,000 per MW (Topham and McMillan 2017). 
Most jurisdictions require that the infrastructures are removed once projects cease 
operation and that the site is returned to its initial state. To prevent insolvency risks 
due to these high costs, most jurisdictions now require owners to provide strong 
financial guarantees i.e. paying into a secure decommissioning fund during the life of 
the facility, bonds or letters of credit. Furthermore, the growing capacity of offshore 
wind installations is seeing the volume of O&M and future decommissioning work grow 
too. Both these activities putting key supply chain resources, such as the vessels that 
are typically used in both the offshore wind and in oil and gas industries. 
In addition, circular economy principles must be encouraged by means of targeting 
sustainable solutions once projects are decommissioned. It has been estimated that 
between 80-90% of the weight of a wind turbine could be recycled, as mainly 
corresponds to metals (Topham et al. 2019). This would not only reduce 
decommissioning costs by 20% but also lessen the amount of raw materials used, 
yielding obvious environmental benefits. Blades, however, are currently one of the 
biggest challenges faced regarding decommissioning offshore wind projects as are 
found to be very difficult to reuse/recycle due to its material composition while being 
the most voluminous part of the wind turbine which difficulties its handling, so are 
currently just being shredded and incinerated, or sent to landfill for disposal. 
 
Further research is necessary to develop better sustainable solutions. Besides, wind 
turbine components in good condition should be encouraged for reusing purposes, 
and/or refurbished to be reutilised in other projects. This idea has led to second-hand 
markets emerging, were components and even turbines are given a second chance 
at a reduced cost. The tendency is that in the near future, the industry shifts to reusing 
more of the structures in order to minimise costs, as large projects will try to reuse part 
of its existing infrastructure to keep the project ongoing for as long as possible by 
means of refurbishing and repowering.  
Local Content and the Cost Reduction Drive 
There are some important interactions between the cost reduction drive and the desire 
to increase local content of Scottish projects. 
The first of these concerns likely costs of seabed leases. Crown Estate Scotland have 
commendably set up ScotWind to make it financially attractive in terms of leasing costs 
(Pinsent Masons 2019). The cost of offshore acreage in ScotWind is likely to be 
substantially less than that of England and Wales coast (rUK) round four. This is 
intended to counter-balance the higher inherent costs of development in Scotland, 
such as deep water, TNUoS etc. (see Pinsent Masons 2019). Ultimately, this is one of 
the reasons there has been so much developer interest in ScotWind to date. However, 
it does have the unfortunate effect of further shrinking the GVA benefit in the DEVEX 
phase of projects, where historically projects would have been paying substantially 
more to the UK’s Crown Estate in order to secure acreage. This does create a 
challenge as the local content in the project DEVEX has historically been very high in 
the UK, very often over 70% (BVG 2019). 
Secondly, in the operational phase, future projects in Scottish waters are likely to be 
more reliant on larger service vessels (SOVs) which to date have been manufactured 
in Norway and Denmark (ESVAGT 2020). Earlier offshore wind rounds tended to be 
serviced by small workboats (CTVs), which were generally UK manufactured and 
crewed. As a result, the operational phase of an offshore wind project tends to be 
where local content calculations show the biggest benefit. However, the likely 
reduction in project spend on UK manufactured vessels means that any increased 
local content will likely have to come from other aspects of the supply chain.  
5. What more can the sector and other key stakeholders do to tackle these? 
As per Question 4, some associated actions could usefully be taken to tackle these 
project cost challenges: 
 Heavy lifting vessel demand continues to rise due in line with the marine 
activities of the offshore wind and oil and gas sectors. Stakeholders could 
usefully coordinate with other offshore stakeholders and in advance, plan their 
activities alongside other offshore projects within the area. This could help save 
high mobilisation costs and reduce associated logistics time. 
 
 Research consortiums and partnerships are being created to face common 
challenges encountered within the industry, such as best ways to deal with 
decommissioning or develop blade recycling solutions. 
 Create market mechanisms that encourage component reuse in offshore wind 
projects, to reduce the lifetime environmental impact of these installations. 
8. What steps can be taken to improve interactions between offshore wind and 
other marine sectors?  
24. What can be done, on the part of government and / or others, to strengthen 
and benefit from the synergies with a) hydrogen and b) the oil and gas sector? 
There is naturally a tremendous amount of overlap in the knowledge and skills accrued 
across the offshore wind sector and other synergistic offshore and marine renewable 
sectors, such as wave and tidal stream. Importantly, this relates to a two-way 
exchange of information, where advances in offshore wind (e.g. floating wind) could 
potentially support these marine technologies and vice versa. Examples include sub-
sea cables, foundations, moorings and connectors.  
Drawing upon Hannon et al.’s (2017) research into the effectiveness of the UK’s wave 
energy innovation policy, we note that the UK’s marine energy sector has not had a 
particularly strong track record in knowledge exchange in the past. It is important 
lessons are learned from this and applied to the offshore wind sector where applicable. 
Consequently, we presented a set of best-practice guidelines to engender knowledge 
exchange and collaboration between offshore renewable sectors: 
1. Avoid over-reliance on private sector for funding numerous discrete early 
stage innovation projects - The ‘state aid’ linked requirement for recipients of 
public grants to secure a significant amount of private sector match-funding has 
placed an intense pressure on offshore renewables developers to ‘fast track’ 
their innovation timeline and avoid knowledge exchange in a bid to protect their 
intellectual property (IP). This led to ‘best practice’ not being shared across the 
marine energy sector and the same mistakes being made by numerous 
different companies. State aid compliant procurement frameworks, such as 
Wave Energy Scotland, can avoid the need for private sector match funding, 
and its associated pressures to avoid sharing sensitive information, by offering 
100% public funding for earlier stage innovation projects. The same principles 
could be usefully applied to driving innovation in early-stage offshore wind 
technologies, such as novel foundations or turbines types. 
2. Mandate knowledge sharing from publicly funded projects – Traditionally 
many publicly (part-)funded projects have not had to make their results publicly 
available or have not seen their IP licensed. To engender knowledge exchange 
and collaboration between offshore renewable and marine sectors, it is 
essential that there is a requirement for: a) all results to be made publicly 
available, with knowledge hosted on a ‘free-to-access’ online repository; and b) 
a requirement to licence any IP generated. If the latter is not achieved, then 
 
government have the option to take ownership of the IP and licence it. Again, 
Wave Energy Scotland employed the latter approach and also retrospectively 
actioned the former by purchasing the IP of former wave power developers and 
making it publicly available via an online library. The same principles could 
usefully be applied to publicly funded early stage offshore wind projects. 
3. Joint industry projects to promote collaboration – Consortia based funding 
models, where a combination of public and private funding to tackled innovation 
challenges shared by the sector as a whole are critical. Joint-Industry Projects 
are a useful model to follow and we note Scottish Government has employed 
with the Floating wind Joint Industry Project, which offers an excellent 
foundation. We note however that there this initiative could usefully sit within a 
wider umbrella JIP that focuses on offshore renewables and brings together a 
wider set of actors to work towards shared offshore renewable challenges (e.g. 
connections, mooring, environmental impacts). This would promote a two-way 
flow of information: 
a. Top-down – where solutions applicable to wider offshore renewable 
challenges filter down to new offshore wind technologies (e.g. floating 
wind); and 
b. Bottom-up – where solutions specific to offshore wind challenges (e.g. 
floating wind) could be applied across other synergistic offshore 
renewable sectors (e.g. tidal stream).  
Turning to oil and gas there is an opportunity to redefine the supply chain so this long-
standing sector can be reutilised to support offshore wind and other marine sectors 
(i.e. tidal, wave). This would not only feed in through facilities, ports and factories, but 
also by means of sharing knowledge and experience. On the latter, floating wind draws 
heavily from oil and gas floating platform technologies, bottom-fixed turbine 
foundations have also borrowed from the sector too (i.e. monopiles, jackets) 
(Windpowermonthly 2014). In summary, mapping shared supply chain services to 
deliver offshore wind projects, in addition to the ongoing exchange of knowledge to 
support wind power innovations, is critical to bolstering deployment of UK offshore 
wind. 
9. How could a competitive market framework that promotes the development 
of floating wind be developed whilst still retaining value for money for the 
consumer? 
23. What actions should be taken to address the key challenges facing the 
uptake of commercial scale floating in Scotland? 
With 32 MW and 56% of global capacity, the UK is the current world leader in floating 
wind deployment. It has undoubtedly led the world in terms of the scale and ambition 
of projects, and this trend is likely to continue. By 2022, this could rise to 78 MW if we 
consider projects that have at least applied for consent (), with a further 1.9 GW of 
projects in the pipeline that have yet to apply for consent ().  
  
Figure 1: Cumulative installed capacity to 2022 by nationality (excluding projects in early planning) (Source: 
Hannon et al. 2019) 
NOTE: Record-capacity installations shown by circle area and are sized proportionally 
Figure 2: Installed capacity (MW) by nationality of deployment (only early-planning projects) (Source: Hannon et 
al. 2019)) 
The majority of these planned projects are large, utility-scale arrays, the average 
installed capacity being 248 MW. At this scale, they will be competing directly against 
both bottom-fixed offshore wind and onshore wind for market share, assuming there 
are still sufficient suitable sites for both in the lead up to 2030. This raises questions 
about whether this is the most suitable path forward for growing the floating wind 
market in the UK. 
In the absence of the Renewables Obligation (RO) (see Questions 20 and 21), a 
paying customer becomes more important than ever in terms of growing start-ups with 
new product-services and building a supply chain capable of delivering floating wind 
‘at scale’ within the next 10 years. This first tranche of projects are critical to 
demonstrating the commercial potential of the technology and reinforcing its 
legitimacy, in turn helping attract further investment. Finally, these first projects are 
also essential to generating knowledge through ‘learning by doing, using and 
interacting’, which helps to optimise future projects and drive down cost. 
Without subsidy, delivering this first tranche of projects will be extremely challenging 
when we consider that they carry a higher levelised cost than some other competing 
forms of renewable power, not least bottom-fixed offshore wind and onshore wind. We 
may encounter a situation whereby suitable onshore and bottom-fixed offshore sites 
begin to dwindle over the comings years and we reach a point where, in order to meet 
our net-zero ambitions, we must turn to floating wind only to find that the technology 
and supply chain are not sufficiently developed to provide wide-scale deployment. 
One route forward may be to identify potential niche markets, where the unique 
advantages of floating wind means it makes commercial sense to deploy. Historically, 
we have seen new technologies typically gain traction in niche markets before enjoying 
 
wider scale deployment. Examples include solar PV on satellites and lighthouses, or 
electric vehicle battery technology in airport vehicles, golf buggies and fork-lift trucks. 
These all presented novel solutions to distinctive challenges, in a context where the 
user was willing and able to pay a relatively higher cost for this versus other offerings. 
These niche markets ultimately acted as a ‘spring board’ for these technologies to 
launch into much larger, mainstream markets. 
Floating wind’s primary advantage over other forms of wind power is that it avoids 
competition for space or restrictions on land-use as faced by onshore wind, and can 
be sited offshore in water more than 50-60m deep, unlike bottom-fixed offshore wind. 
In the case of Scotland, there are a number of potential niche markets, including deep-
water aquaculture and off-grid islands that rely on oil-fired generators for power. Whilst 
additional research is required into their potential, there is little evidence to suggest 
that either present natural niche markets for floating wind, see for example Aquaterra’s 
report on aquaculture and how commercial-scale (floating) offshore wind turbines are 
“unlikely to be suitable due to scale of technology and capital costs involved” 
(Aquaterra 2014).  
In contrast, floating wind to power offshore oil and gas platforms is a potentially much 
more promising niche market. Around 16 TWh per annum of power is consumed by 
oil and gas platforms globally, comparable to the domestic electricity consumption of 
Croatia (~15 TWh/yr) (Wood MacKenzie 2019). In turn, this generates roughly 200 
million tonnes of CO2 a year, which is equivalent to Argentina’s territorial emissions. 
To power these platforms “around 5 percent of global offshore oil and gas wellhead 
production is used as fuel to power offshore production platforms” (Wood MacKenzie 
2019). Floating wind power would therefore displace the need to burn these fossil fuels 
to power further extraction, saving a valuable market commodity for general sale. 
Utilising floating wind could also save vital space on the rigs, improve health and safety 
and to reduce the carbon footprint of their fossil fuel production (Wood MacKenzie 
2019). 
Whilst various options exist to replace oil or gas turbines with renewable power (e.g. 
connections to the mainland renewables), various major oil and gas companies are 
already moving to take advantage of floating wind to power their offshore platforms. 
The current global market leader for floating wind is Equinor, with 32 MW across two 
projects. Equinor is also developing a 88 MW Tampen array next to the five Snorre A 
and B and Gullfaks A, B and C platforms off Norway, which will provide 35% of their 
annual power demand and reduce emissions by 200,000 tCO2/yr (Equinor 2020). Its 
deep-water location (260-300m) means bottom-fixed offshore wind was not viable, nor 
was providing a connection to the mainland due to its 140km distance from shore 
(Equinor 2020). The project will deploy 11 Siemens Gamesa 8 MW turbines, cost 
approximately £390m and be operational by 2022. Importantly, it will receive 
approximately £180m in funding from Norwegian government, evidencing the 
significant subsidy still needed to deliver floating wind (Offshorwind.biz 2020). 
 
A large number of other oil and gas majors are also investing heavily in floating wind 
RD&D: 
 Shell, the world’s second most valuable oil and gas company, has invested in 
Stiesdal’s TetraSpar demonstration project, due for commissioning in 2020, 
increasing its share in the project to 66% in 2019 (Wind Power Offshore 2019). 
It also invested in Makani, which recently deployed its airborne wind energy kite 
system offshore (Felker 2019). Since Alphabet (aka Google) pulled out of 
Makani, Shell are still considering further investment (Recharge 2020).  
 Repsol, the major Spanish oil and gas company, became a 19% shareholder 
in the WindPlus subsidiary, set up to deliver the 25 MW WindFloat Atlantic 
project off the west coast of Portugal (EIB, 2018). 
 In 2020 Total “signed an agreement with the developer Simply Blue Energy to 
acquire 80% stake in the pioneering floating wind project Erebus located in the 
Celtic Sea, in Wales. The project will have a 96 MW capacity and will be 
installed in an area with water depth of 70 meters” (Total 2020). 
There is a broader ethical question about whether the oil and gas industry are 
employing floating wind as part of their transition away from fossil fuels and towards 
renewable power or they are using it to support ‘business as usual’, by enabling 
relatively minor emissions cuts across their oil and gas production regime. There is 
also the question of how long the floating wind powered rig model will remain 
commercially viable as the wider economy transitions away from fossil fuels and its 
business model becomes compromised. Either way, in the short-to-medium term, it 
presents Scotland with a compelling niche market to explore, especially considering 
that there are 184 offshore rigs in the North Sea alone (Rigzone 2018). Harnessing 
this niche market could then put Scotland in a stronger position to be able to deploy 
utility-scale floating wind projects in its deeper waters over the next decade.  
13. What areas of the Scottish supply chain do we excel at, and what could we 
do better? 
Again, we employ a focus on floating wind given our recent research into it (see 
Hannon et al. 2019). The UK currently has no major floating foundation developers 
and the UK’s two flagship floating wind projects, Hywind Buchan Deep and Kincardine, 
have relied heavily on overseas firms to be delivered. Almost two thirds of the 
companies directly involved with these projects were non-UK headquartered and 
furthermore, both projects are majority owned by overseas firms:  
a) Hywind by the Norwegian oil and gas company Equinor; and 
b) Kincardine by the Spanish OEM, ACS Group.  
This is representative of the broader situation across the UK’s offshore wind sector, 
where the majority of supply chain content is controlled by foreign companies (see 
BVG Associates and Whitmarsh). Where we do find UK firms, they are mostly involved 
in project development and O&M, but are largely absent in the manufacture and supply 
 
of key components, especially turbines, foundations, etc. A full supply-chain 
breakdown is provided for both cases on p.64-5 in Appendix A of Hannon et al. 2019.  
The overwhelming majority of these overseas firms are either from the EU or the 
European Economic Area (e.g. Norway) – and by extension the European single 
market. Brexit therefore raises serious questions about how leaving the single market 
and the customs union could impact negatively on the prospects of future UK floating 
wind projects. This is due to the potential introduction of tariffs, supply-chain disruption 
and a lack of access to skilled labour. It also raises concerns about the health of the 
UK firms involved in floating wind, which currently export products or services to EU 
countries. A weakening of these firms may erode the UK’s capacity to deliver its 
current pipeline of floating wind projects. 
Such an arrangement also cuts both-ways; simultaneously limiting UK floating wind 
projects’ access to imported products and services from Europe and UK companies’ 
access to exporting a European floating wind market, which has 870 MW of capacity 
in the development pipeline (Hannon et al. 2019). This could have a negative impact 
upon the health of the companies that currently or could potentially export products or 
services to EU markets. In turn, this could damage their capacity (e.g. capital, 
knowledge, skills, reputation etc.) to help deliver floating wind projects back in the UK. 
It is therefore essential we assess how Brexit will impact upon cost and delivery 
timelines of floating wind projects, as well as the financial performance of UK offshore 
wind companies. Consideration should be given to what trading arrangements will 
support the future growth of floating wind in the UK and Europe more widely. 
We acknowledge that another means of increasing the UK’s domestic content of 
floating wind, and indeed offshore wind more broadly, could be to demand a minimum 
threshold of domestic content that projects must meet to unlock subsidies (e.g. via the 
CfD). Whilst we acknowledge the potentially powerful role this could have in 
encouraging the expansion of the domestic offshore wind supply chain, it also creates 
a new risk that projects with a lower domestic content going undelivered. This is in turn 
potentially threatens the UK’s commitment to deliver 30 GW of offshore wind by 2030 
and put its net-zero emissions target in jeopardy. Furthermore, any sanctions imposed 
on non-domestic firms providing essential products and services could be mirrored by 
countries elsewhere, thus limiting the UK’s scope for exports.  
Consequently, to avoid these unintended consequences and ensure that projects still 
get built, it could be that offshore wind projects above a certain level of domestic 
content (e.g. 60%) are not excluded from the CfD auction but receive a ‘bonus 
payment’. This might for instance constitute a ‘top up’ on their strike price, at an 
additional £X/MWh. Furthermore, such an arrangement would usefully consider the 
local/regional economic benefits these projects could provide through an increased 
share of domestic content (e.g. tax receipts, jobs, supply chain benefits). 
14. Where are the new areas that Scotland can develop and exploit a competitive 
supply chain advantage? 
 
The offshore decommissioning sector can offer an important socio-economic 
opportunity and job creation for Scotland and the UK, while already having a well-
established oil and gas supply chain. With numerous ports having been involved in oil 
and gas decommissioning (Aberdeen, Dundee, Nigg Energy Park - Moray Firth, Dales 
Voe – Shetland, etc.)  and with the port of Blyth as UK’s example for participating on 
both the oil and gas and offshore wind industry, Scotland could also seek to establish 
key ports for decommissioning and recycling components within the North Sea by 
means of redefining and investing in its current facilities. 
The expected peaking decommissioning demand and the need of recycling services 
in the upcoming years in contrast to the current lack of available ports that can provide 
these solutions could make Scotland become a key player during the dismantling 
phase of these sectors. Moreover, it would also enhance the provision of more 
sustainable end of life solutions for these projects where the amount of materials 
reused and recycled is maximised in order to minimise the volume of waste sent to 
landfill, while creating a greener and more sustainable economy. 
One further potentially valuable area is met-ocean sensing (i.e. direct measurement 
of wind, wave, current). Wind farms typically use a mix of wave buoys and wave radars 
and use this information to support operational decisions. However, 
increased/improved met-ocean measurement has the potential to be very valuable 
especially when sites cover very large geographic areas (Browell et al. 2016). Scotland 
has excellent knowledge base in sensor technology and a number of SMEs in this 
space. The export market for such technologies is likely to grow as global growth in 
offshore wind accelerates this decade. 
15. What are the main challenges a company faces when tendering for a 
contract? 
16. Subject to procurement law, what more should government and its agencies 
do to assist the supply chain secure contracts? 
A major barrier to those Scottish companies who would like to enter the offshore wind 
supply chain is the contractual packaging of a typical offshore wind project. A 
developer will seek to manage risk in procurement and construction by separating the 
project into key packages (e.g. marine package, turbine package, OFTO package 
etc.). The party appointed to manage each package effectively takes procurement 
decisions on behalf of the developer. In order to manage this inherited risk, the 
package manager will fall back on existing trusted supply chain relationships. This 
creates an effective block on any new entrant who desires to enter the supply chain, 
no matter how good or well-priced their product might be.  
Rigidity in contracting and procurement structures established to support the  market 
can also constrain operators’, and the wider supply chain’s, ability to adapt to meet 
changing demands. Increasing the flexibility of the existing procurement strategies, 
whilst reducing the previous experience proof requirements would allow new 
participants to enter the market and potentially present innovative approaches. 
 
17. What are the key skills issues and gaps facing the sector over the coming 
years, in the short and medium term? 
Two key areas of focus for growing supply chain skills and capacity include: 
 Decommissioning of projects in the North Sea will rapidly progress and 
vessels demand will peak, as are needed decommissioning of both oil and gas 
and installation and O&M of offshore wind. 
 Blade recycling solutions and expertise – expertise on how to integrate 
circular economy principles, and in general, how to make projects more 
sustainable from a raw materials and life-cycle perspective (Strathclyde 2020). 
18. What more should government and the sector do to build on the progress 
made in recent years? 
One potentially useful route forward would be to establish a transparency platform, 
where as much as possible useful non-confidential information regarding offshore wind 
projects across all stages is uploaded and available for research or data analysis. This 
focus here is on promoting sectoral best-practice and ramping up cost-effectiveness 
for all parties. 
20. What can the Scottish Government most usefully and feasibly do to build on 
the innovation support previously and currently available? 
21. How can we support technologies and developments which reach a viable 
stage between leasing rounds and CfD auctions? 
Drawing upon the floating wind report from Hannon et al. 2019 our research identified 
two major concerns surrounding the UK and Scotland’s innovation support for floating 
wind are expected to undermine growth of floating wind in the UK: 
1. A critical lack of long-term revenue payments for pre-commercial floating 
wind projects; and  
2. An over-reliance on EU innovation support, access to which is under threat 
from Brexit.  
Should the UK fail to put in place a long-term revenue payment programme for pre-
commercial floating wind and/or retain access to EU innovation funds, UK floating wind 
projects are unlikely to be able to source the patient pre-commercial capital they 
require to both scale-up and drive down costs. We unpack these in more detail below 
and emphasise that the lessons are relevant to all early stage offshore wind 
innovations; not just floating wind. 
Long-term revenue payments 
Long-term revenue payments represent an important ‘market-pull’ mechanism that 
generate a market demand for new generation technologies. In essence, they 
 
subsidise the cost of energy of immature technologies, opening up market applications 
that would have otherwise not been financially viable. 
Until recently, pre-commercial and commercial UK floating wind projects were able to 
access the Renewable Obligation (RO) (Figure 3). It provided eligible renewable 
generators with support per MWh of renewable electricity generated at a fixed rate for 
20 years. In Scotland, special provision was made for floating wind, which received 
3.5 ROCs per MWh (Ofgem, 2018). 
 
Figure 3: Major funding programmes offering innovation support to floating wind projects in the UK (Source: Hannon 
et al. 2019) 
NOTE: LCITP - Low Carbon Infrastructure Transition Programme; ERDF - European Regional Development Fund; 
GIB - Green Investment Bank; EIB - European Investment Bank; CfD - Contracts for Difference 
Both of the UK’s floating wind projects that have been delivered to date have relied 
heavily upon the Renewables Obligation (RO). For example, taking the period from 1st 
Dec 2017 to 30th November 2018, we estimate that Equinor received £25m from the 
RO during this period1.  
                                            
1 Data was taken from Ofgem's Renewables and CHP Register. The number of ROCs is calculated by 
the number of Renewable Energy Guarantees of Origin (REGOs), multiplied by the 3.5 ROCs per MWh 
for floating wind. Assumes a buy-out price of £45.58 for 2017/18 and £47.22 for 2018/19 (Ofgem, 2018) 
per ROC, each period running from 1 April to 31 March. A recycle value of £5.85 per ROC is taken for 
both the 2017/18 and 2018/19 period (Ofgem, 2018). Recycle value for 2018/19 not available at time 
of calculation so we have adopted the previous year’s, which is likely to be marginally lower than the 
actual value, potentially under-estimating the total subsidy Equinor received. Our independent analysis, 
which accounts for a typical wind resource year and Equinor's own capacity factor for Hywind Buchan 
Deep, yields a very similar amount of subsidy, suggesting this level of subsidy is likely to be normal 
over forthcoming years. Equinor declined to confirm the exact sum they received via the RO for Buchan 
Deep. 
 
In October 2018, the RO closed to any new floating wind generation, meaning this 
valuable source of pre-commercial support was no longer available. Prior to the 
announcement, the floating wind industry encouraged government to extend the 
deadline to April 2020 (Foxwell, 2018), claiming two further consented schemes, 
namely the 10 MW Dounreay Tri and 12 MW ForthWind, would be unlikely to go ahead 
without the subsidy (Ward, 2018). The extension was not granted and today the future 
of both these projects remains in doubt (4COffshore, 2018). 
With the RO now discontinued, and no analogous scheme in line to replace it, there is 
a distinct lack of long-term support for relatively small-scale pre-commercial floating 
wind projects. The RO played an important role in providing long-term government 
support for projects that were too large for the Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) (capacity up to 5 
MW) and/or too advanced to access earlier stage grant funding. It also offered funding 
for projects too small and immature to realistically secure funding via the Contracts for 
Difference (CfD), which is essentially designed to support utility scale projects. 
Consequently, floating wind developers are now left with the CFD as the only 
significant route to long-term subsidy. However, relatively small-scale floating wind 
projects are expected to struggle to compete with much cheaper forms of power for 
subsidy (e.g. bottom-fixed offshore wind). 
We note and support the proposals to amend the structure of the CfD in BEIS’s latest 
consultation (BEIS 2020) so that traditional bottom-fixed offshore wind is separated 
from floating wind, and placed into its own pot (Pot 3). We would agree that this would 
avoid a situation whereby floating wind is no longer competing against the significantly 
cheaper and more technologically mature traditional offshore wind. 
Importantly though, floating wind would still be in direct competition with other cheaper 
Pot 2 technologies, like remote island onshore wind. For example, remote island wind 
secured a strike price of between £40/MWh (2012 prices) for delivery in 2024/25 (BEIS 
2019), which is still significantly cheaper than the Offshore Renewable Energy 
Catapult’s estimated cost for floating wind of £135/MWh by 2025 (ORE Catapult 2018). 
Consequently, we do not expect floating wind to be competing on a ‘level playing field’ 
for CfDs, even if offshore wind migrates to another pot. 
There is a need for objective and transparent modelling of the future LCOEs of the 
technologies currently in Pot 2 over the coming 5 years. This is to better understand 
whether any of the 10 ‘less established’ technologies are already exhibiting signs of 
being significantly cheaper and should be located in a separate pot to create a more 
‘level playing field’. This may result in the creation of an innovation-oriented CfD pot 
that allows for more expensive but potentially important pre-commercial technologies 
(e.g. floating wind, tidal stream, wave) to compete against one another for a limited 
combined capacity of projects that are guaranteed a reasonable strike-price (see 
Scottish Renewables 2019). 
 
 
Access EU innovation support 
Whilst the UK has provided targeted grants to support earlier stage floating wind 
innovation (e.g. Scottish Government’s £1m Floating Wind Joint Industry Project 
(JIP)), much of the support for such projects is available through the EU. The EU 
provides significant grant funding from part-scale demonstration (e.g. Horizon 2020), 
all the way through to full-scale deployment (e.g. EU Innovation Fund) (Figure 3).  
Brexit threatens UK-based floating wind developers’ access to this wealth of EU 
energy innovation funding, with no guarantee that they would be replaced like-with-
like by funding from UK government or devolved administrations. To avoid any shortfall 
in available innovation support, it is therefore critical that there is a concerted move 
towards retaining access to EU demonstration funding post-Brexit. Should this not be 
achievable, then the UK must consider how it can use its own public funds to cover 
any shortfall, with a focus on both grants and government-backed finance for 
demonstration schemes.  
Moving further along the innovation chain towards (pre-)commercial deployment the 
EU also offers government backed finance for companies involved in later stage 
demonstration schemes, such as through the European Investment Bank. It offers 
financial support specifically tailored to the needs for small-scale companies that are 
delivering innovative products and services through its Innovfin programme. It 
provides a wide range of loans, guarantees and equity-type funding to projects 
deemed too risky to access other sources of funding on affordable terms (EIB, 2014). 
It typically offers finance of between €7.5m and €75m to innovative energy 
demonstration projects (EIB, 2019). For example, it provided a €60m loan to the 25 
MW Windfloat Atlantic project (European Commission, 2018). 
Brexit raises serious questions over whether UK companies will still be able to access 
this finance. With the discontinuation of the UK’s Green Investment Bank, this means 
that Scotland’s innovative offshore renewable start-up companies are left with 
schemes that offer relatively small sums of funding, such as the UK’s £20m Clean 
Growth Fund (BEIS, 2019) and the Scottish Government’s £20m Energy Investment 
Fund. It remains to be seen whether Scotland’s new £200m per annum National 
Investment Bank, due in 2020, will make significant sums of low-cost finance available 
to these renewable energy start-ups, especially floating wind companies. 
The level and type of innovation support given over to innovative forms of offshore 
wind, like floating wind, is only part of the challenge. Ensuring this is coordinated in a 
coherent fashion between different government departments, and also between 
governments operating at different levels of governance (e.g. regional, national, supra-
national) is critical. Without appropriate coordination, it is likely we will see either 
duplication of effort in some places and the funding of competing, rather than 
complementary agenda (see Hannon et al. 2017). The latter may see multiple public 
bodies funding a wide variety of small-scale innovation efforts that advance multiple 
 
competing floating wind designs, as opposed to consolidating these efforts in a single 
large-scale project focused on just one or two designs. 
There are still significant opportunities to improve the degree of co-ordination of 
offshore renewable energy RD&D support, both within and across different levels of 
government. There is very little public information available about the operational 
structure and effectiveness of energy RD&D coordinating bodies like the UK’s Energy 
Innovation Board. In theory this brings together the relevant parties to coordinate the 
vast majority of UK-level innovation funding, with representatives from BEIS, Innovate 
UK, Research Councils, Defra, DfID, DfT and Ofgem. Whilst devolved administration 
are able to attend meetings, they do so in an observer capacity (BEIS 2018). Whilst it 
remains to be seen whether the UK continues to access EU innovation funding 
programmes (e.g. Horizon 2020), we also note that there is no formal membership 
from relevant European/EU bodies (e.g. European Commission, European Investment 
Bank) active in UK energy innovation funding. Consequently, we find that efforts to 
coordinate energy innovation funding are focused at the UK-level and rather overlook 
the need to coordinate national programmes with other sub- and supra-national 
programmes to maximize their cost-effectiveness. 
22. Where respondents believe that scope remains for innovation in fixed 
offshore wind, what areas should be prioritised? 
There are two key areas where innovation should be utilised to further reduce the costs 
of fixed bottom offshore wind. Both leverage substantial knowledge bases in Scotland. 
Turbine Design 
Turbine design innovation since the late 1980’s has been based on iterating the so-
called Danish concept wind turbine. That is a single rotor on the horizontal axis. The 
main innovations since then have been on the generator and power electronics side. 
There are two promising avenues for turbine design innovation which could lead to 
substantially lower costs  
 Multi rotor systems - In this design, the turbine has multiple horizontal axis 
rotors. This design innovation has the advantage of functional redundancy 
(very important for far-shore offshore wind). It also lends itself much better to 
mass production as the individual components are smaller and can me 
manufactured in a smaller factory (see Jamieson 2018).  
 X-rotor - This is a University of Strathclyde led innovation, which represents 
the next big evolution of turbine design. The weight distribution of X-rotor is 
much better suited to floating wind than current conventional designs (see 
Leithead 2019). 
Operational Improvement 
Operational phase accounts for around 30% of offshore wind costs. Any successful 
innovation action directed at operations cans significantly reduce the cost of offshore 
 
wind, especially with many projects now assuming a 30+ year project life. Scotland 
has a particularly strong operations innovation knowledge base, with several 
Universities, SMEs and consultancies very active in this space. Many operational 
innovations will also have a safety improvement aspect. Take for instance Limpet’s 
solutions that offer a means of both safer and faster access to tall structures such as 
wind turbines. It was supported through OREC’s ‘Backing the Game Changers’ 
programme (Limpet Technology 2020). 
